significant advances in stratification theory (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992 ) and class analysis (Wright 1985) . Second, proponents base their case on dubious statistical manipulations, seldom employing multivariate models in their analyses. We develop new evidence of how class relates to voting behavior in the United States using a more sophisticated class schema-informed by recent developments in stratification theory and research-and a new statistical measure based on a multinomial logistic regression model for calibrating the extent of class voting. We apply the class schema and new statistical measure to American National Election Study (ANES) data to analyze U.S. presidential elections between 1948 and 1992. Our results challenge both the recent scholarly consensus that class voting is steadily declining and the broader claim that ongoing changes in party systems or mass publics require abandoning the study of the social bases of politics.
Our analysis of class voting in the United States begins with a theoretical distinction between what we term traditional class voting and total class voting and develops statistical models appropriate to each. Traditional models of class voting assume a close correspondence between the working class and parties on the left and between the middle class and parties on the center or right. This assumption may be embedded in models of class voting that identify the "natural" party of a given class (Rose and McAllister 1986 ; Weakliem 1995; Goldthorpe forthcoming) or in models that array classes and parties as ordered points on latent continua and examine the degree to which they are associated (Weakliem and Heath forthcoming). Whatever its particular form, this assumption is appropriate only for understanding the historically significant traditional pattern of the relationship between classes and political parties that has characterized most capitalist democracies in the twentieth century.
Class voting need not be limited to the combinations assumed in the traditional conception. First, class affects voter turnout as well as partisan choice (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) . Class differences in participation probably have important consequences for the party system and public policy (Burnham
1982; Piven and Cloward 1988). Yet analyses of class voting in the United States rarely consider voting and nonvoting simultaneously (Weakliem and Heath forthcoming).
We include nonvoting in our conception of the total effect of class on voting. Second, even within the ambit of partisan choice, traditional alliances are not the only class differences to consider. In other words, the sum of all class differences in voting behaviorwhich we term total class voting-is more inclusive than traditional class voting. Traditional class voting, while clearly important to the study of class voting, is a specific configuration in the comparative and historical alignment of classes and parties, but it is not the only way in which classes can differ at the polls. Traditional class voting contributes to total class voting, but the patterns of voting and partisanship can and do shift. Shifts in traditional class voting patterns are typically interpreted as realignment (i.e., as confirmation of the declining importance of class for voting behavior). Our total class voting approach shows that while the traditional link between classes and parties have undergone realignment, the effect of class location on voting behavior remains significant.
Our distinction between traditional class voting and total class voting is related to Mair's (1993) distinction between "class politics" and "class voting." According to Mair, class voting signifies a tendency for classes to ally themselves with different parties in a given election; class politics require that these coalitions persist over several elections and become institutionalized. Total class voting as we have defined it requires only class voting. Discussions of the decline of traditional class voting implicitly assume-but do not demonstrate-an erosion of class politics. Although the United States has had low but significant class voting throughout the postwar period, class politics have never grown from it.
The concept of traditional class voting is deeply rooted in the literature. It is unavoidable when class is conceived or operationalized as a dichotomy. A multiclass approach implied by contemporary theories of class and stratification invites a distinction between total and traditional class voting, as does our decision to simultaneously consider several voting outcomes (including not vot-ing). In our analysis of class voting in the United States since World War II, we specify one statistical model predicated on traditional class voting and another predicated on total class voting. The total class voting model fits the data better.
THE DECLINING POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS
Most analyses of class voting in Western democracies in recent years have claimed that the effect of class on voting has declined significantly over time (Manza et al. 1995) . This thesis holds that although there is variation from one country to another in the level of class voting, class is a less viable predictor of voting behavior in many capitalist democracies today than it was in earlier periods.
Theories of the Changing Class Bases of Politics
The claim that class voting is declining is closely associated with the post-1980 writings by Lipset. Lipset ([1960] 1981) developed an impressive array of case studies to argue that class struggles in democratic capitalist societies were moving from the workplace to the political arena. In the 1960 edition of Political Man he argued that, even in the United States, Republicans and Democrats "represent the interests of different classes" (p. 230). Lipset's more recent work, however, claims that Western democracies are now moving beyond class politics. For example, in the 1981 expanded edition of Political Man he argues that an important turn in the political life of post-industrial capitalist democracies has displaced class cleavages; class is no longer crucial to electoral politics (Lipset [1960] A related third hypothesis links the decline in class voting to changes in the social and ideological bases of political attitudes among mass publics, particularly among educated sectors of the middle class. For example, "two lefts"-one with a working-class constituency and one with a middle-class constituency-may maintain an uneasy coalition despite divergent ideological commitments and distinct social bases (Parkin 1968 In this paper we develop a statistical approach that enables us to assess changes in both traditional and nontraditional patterns. Our distinction between total class voting and traditional class voting permits us to investigate the extent to which all class differences in partisan vote have declined (total class voting), and whether working-class voters continue to support Democrats while middleclass voters support Republicans (traditional class voting pattern). We use two different statistical models to test for changes in traditional and total class voting in U.S. politics. For traditional class voting, we specify a "uniform difference" model that fixes the classes in a left-to-right political order and estimates the extent to which class (so constrained) is associated with partisan choice in each presidential election studied. We also specify a multinomial logistic regression model that estimates the total association between class and voting behavior (including nonvoting). This approach yields several coefficients for each election that we summarize by a new, general class-voting index that we term kappa (K). Because this statistical framework can include controls for the effects of other variables that are important for voting and are correlated with class, we compare trends in the "gross kappa" (without controls) versus "net kappa" (with controls).
Throughout our analysis, we measure class effects as a function of their relative differences in vote choices. We take this approach in order to separate fluctuations in the popularity of candidates and parties from fluctuations in the association between class and voting behavior (Heath et al. 1985 We take the Blau and Duncan (1967) schema as our point of departure in developing a class schema for the ANES data because it has so many initial distinctions and because the ANES has used the U.S. Census codes since 1960. We elaborate this schema to distinguish between white-collar and bluecollar service workers and between farm owners and farm managers. We drop their distinctions among operatives and laborers from different industries due to lack of cases. We combine all elections with sufficient occupation data (1960 through 1992) and use a combination of theoretical and empirical criteria (i.e., homogeneity of voting outcomes; Goodman 1981) to reduce this 17-category schema to a more manageable 6-category subset: We arrive at the following significant distinctions:1 (1) Professionals (salaried and self-employed); (2) Managers, administrators, and nonretail sales workers (including farm managers); (3) Owners and proprietors (including farm owners); (4) Nonmanagerial white-collar workers (retail sales, clerical, and white-collar service workers); (5) Skilled workers and foremen; (6) Semiskilled and unskilled blue-collar workers (including farm laborers and service workers).
This schema resembles the revised Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992; Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portcarerro 1979) categories that Heath et al. (1985 Heath et al. ( , 1991 used to study class voting in Britain (Weakliem and Heath forthcoming; Goldthorpe forthcoming). Heath and his colleagues, following Erikson and Goldthorpe's original practice, combined professionals and managers into a single class, which they referred to as the "salariat" (but which was referred to as the service class by Erikson and Goldthorpe [1992; also see Goldthorpe 1995] ). The distinction between professionals and managers is not a routine feature of voting studies, but considering differences in mobility patterns (Hout 1983:73-76 ) and the fact that professionals typically draw their incomes from applying specialized knowledge within market sinecures while managers are embedded in the less sheltered corporate sector, we feel it is a I We exclude students, persons whose primary activity is described as "keeping house," and retired persons from the analysis, although we believe they have a place in class analysis. We exclude them because of practical considerationsfuture research on class voting should develop strategies for analyzing persons in these positions as they constitute more than 40 percent of the electorate. 
Multinomial Logistic Regression
We use a multinomial logistic regression (MLR) model (Maddala 1983 ) to analyze how class affects voting behavior and whether the effects of class have changed since 1948. Neither class nor voting behavior is reduced to a dichotomy because MLR is designed for multiple outcomes and multiple predictors. Furthermore, MLR readily accommodates covariates. We estimate the gross effects of class on voting behavior in a three-way analysis that includes time (i.e., election year) as the only additional variable. We estimate the net effects of class on voting behavior with gender, race, region, age (including age-squared), and education as covariates.2 Because of the complexity of MLR results, we present results in terms of our new measure of total class voting (kappa), then examine three contrasts coded as independent logistic regressions: (1) Partisan choice: voted for the Democratic candidate versus voted for the Republican candidate; (2) Other-candidate choice: voted for the Democratic or Republican candidate versus voted for someone else; (3) Turnout: voted versus did not vote.
All three contrasts are embedded in our index of total class voting. We address two questions: Has the political significance of class, conceptualized as the association between class and voting behavior, declined; and does the traditional conception of the ef-fects of class miss some of the association between class and voting behavior? The two questions are so intricately linked that we cannot address them separately.
For each dependent variable, we evaluate 11 models. The first 6 models examine the "gross effects" of class, that is, they are three-way analyses involving class and election year as independent variables and voting behavior as the dependent variable, not controlling for any other variables. The remaining 5 models examine the "net effects" of class, that is, they control for variables that define social blocs. Our coding schemes for the covariates are shown in the Appendix. We pool data across all 11 surveys (12 elections) by entering election year into the analysis as a series of dummy variables (one for each election year). By using certain interaction terms-for example, class x election year-we can compare the changes in the effects of several variables without generating separate MLR equations for each election. In addition to comparing gross and net effects of class on voting, we include three other important interactions with election year: gender, race, and region. Our six gross effects models are: The first net effects model to include a changing class effect is the "uniform differences" model, which is patterned after the "unidiff' model of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and the "multiplicative uniform layer effect" model of Xie (1992) . The uniform differences model imposes a specific constraint on the three-way interaction of class, vote, and election year by ranking classes according to voting behavior in the same order in each year. All that changes is a multiplicative scalar that increases or decreases the absolute size of each interclass gap (keeping the ratio of one gap to another constant). For the net uniform class differences model, the MLR is: 
A NEW CLASS VOTING INDEX
The enduring appeal of the Alford Index, despite its statistical shortcomings, is its simplicity and ease of use. Our MLR approach solves the statistical problems of the Alford Index at the cost of considerable complexity. Researchers analyzing more than one or two elections or one or two countries need an index that compresses the MLR and logistic regression results into one or a few numbers that can be easily compared over a long timeseries or among countries. To fill that need we propose an index of class voting based on the MLR approach. Following Goodman (1991), we define the index as the standard deviation of class differences in vote choice in a given election. In a given election, our index provides a simple summary of total class voting that can be disaggregated to assess the relative contributions of traditional factors and realignment factors to the overall association. By comparing the index across elections, we can gauge changes in total class voting or its components. Our index can be calculated from the gross or net MLR or logistic regression coefficients.
Our index of total class voting, called "kappa" ( where at is the standard deviation of class differences across the J voting outcomes (including not voting). In this application, T equals the 12 presidential elections, and J equals the four voting outcomes (Democrat, Republican, other, did not vote). In practice, however, only a handful of ANES respondents exercised the "other candidate" voting option in the years when no major independent candidate ran for president-years other than 1968, 1980, and 1992. For years that lacked a significant independent candidate, the large contrast between the "other" category and the other three categories inflates kappa in a way that we regard as spurious. Therefore, we treat the "other" votes as censored in those years and leave the ,CT3 out of the calculation. (Alford 1963, table B-3) , we felt compelled to include these 1948 data.7 The ANES is a stratified random sample of voting-age Americans. Sample sizes vary from approximately 1,200 to 2,500 respondents in a given election year.
The rate of voting as reported in the ANES is high compared with official statistics. In 1964, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988, the ANES validated the self-reports obtained in the personal interview by checking whether local election rolls showed a vote for the respondent. False negatives (i.e., people who reported voting but who were not recorded as having voted) in the validation data and a lack of such data for years prior to 1964 make the validation data inappropriate for our purposes. We proceed with the self-report data: We recognize that they overstate the true rate of turnout and even get the trend in voter turnout wrong, but we believe that it accurately reflects the trend in differential turnout. 8 We work with a single data file in which election year is a variable. For the analyses presented here, we selected only those respondents who were in the labor force at the time of the survey and for whom we had data for all the variables of interest (including previous occupation for the unemployed who were, by definition, looking for work). We refer to these respondents as the experienced labor force. we can examine the coefficients from the MLR results that are inputs to the kappa values or examine the logistic regression results for partisan choice and voter turnout. We find the logistic regression results easier to interpret, so we move to them now.
Class Differences in Partisan Vote Choice
Classes in the United States differ significantly in their propensities to vote for Democrats over Republicans (Table 2) To remove the confounding effects of election year and the covariates, we must select a model predicting partisan choice. Goodness-of-fit statistics in Table 3 show the fit of all eleven models. The first bloc of numbers in Table 3 shows the -2(log likelihood) statistics and degrees of freedom for the six gross effects models and five net effects models. The second bloc shows differences in -2(log likelihood) and degrees of freedom for pairs of models. If the null hypothesis is true, these differences of -2(log likelihood) are distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the degrees of freedom for the two models being compared. In choosing models we focus on the differences in -2(log likelihood). We also refer to the Bic statistics, avoiding models that produce negative Bic values (Raftery 1995) . On the basis of the log likelihood differences we select the full interaction model-the realignment model-for both the gross effects model and net effects model. On the basis of Bic, we select the linear trend model (Model 5) among the gross effects models and net effects models. Both models contain useful information, so we present the To assess the implications of these classspecific trends for the debate on the declining political significance of class, Figure 3 presents partisan kappas for each election, as implied by four of the six models that allow for changes in class effects: gross and net full interaction models, net uniform differences model, and the net linear trend model. (Table 5) show little evidence for an interaction between class and election year. These results surprise us, considering the differences among the percentages in Table 4 tent that this cycle is important, it has to do with a uniform closing and then opening of class differences in turnout. There is no evidence here of a reordering of classes with respect to their effect on turnout.
Two class-specific trends (not shown) also raise questions about the choice of the "no change" model, indicated by the fit statistics. The two sharpest class-specific trends are diverging trends for the classes with the highest and lowest voter turnout. If these results were replicated in a larger data set, (e.g., the CPS series that began in 1964 [Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980] ), then we would conclude that the effect of class on nonvoting was increasing. For now, we must regard these results as evidence that the effect of class on voter turnout has not declined.
A conclusion of "little or no change" in the effect of class on voter turnout should not be mistaken for a conclusion of "no effect." Class has a substantial effect on turnout. The gap between the turnout for professionals and for semiskilled and unskilled workers averages 1.6 on the logit scale, which corresponds to a range of 77 percent to 40 percent (using 60 percent as the average turnout). These differentials are consistent with many previous studies (Manza et al. 1995) . These results confirm the utility of our distinction between "total" and "traditional" class voting for understanding political behavior in the United States and, perhaps, in other democratic capitalist societies as well. The patterns of traditional class partisanship have altered without engendering a decline in the total effect of class on voting behavior. To equate (total) class voting with the traditional class alignment between workers and the Democratic Party (and between highlevel white-collar workers and the Republican Party) is to miss the key scenario of class realignment. By distinguishing total class voting from traditional class voting, we have brought into focus the path by which traditional class politics have given way to new patterns of class voting in the United States.
Who wins under the new alignments? Despite assumptions to the contrary, leftist parties could not forge a majority under the old alignment (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Blue-collar workers never were a majority of the electorate in any industrial nation. As farming declined, the white-collar phalanx emerged to deny industrial workers the majority. The occupational trends likely to prevail in the next 20 years also work against the traditional leftist coalition (Nieuwbeerta 1995) . No one can predict whether the emerging Democratic coalition of semiskilled and unskilled workers, nonmanagerial white-collar workers, and professionals will prove to be any more successful. The degree of moderation necessary to keep professionals in the fold may ultimately blunt the left's agenda (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). But the occupational trends lend some credence to the coalition. The volatility of the skilled workers makes the case even more complicated, for just when the nonmanagerial white-collar workers (the majority of whom are female) came into the Democratic fold, skilled workers (the majority of whom are male) departed. Their departure takes two forms: Some vote Republican and some do not vote. The dynamics merit detailed analysis in panel studies.
While the effect of class on voting behavior is clearly undergoing some important changes, class differentiation itself remains a stable feature in the landscape of U.S. politics. Has realignment taken the struggle out of class differences? In his classic statement on the matter, Lipset ([1960] 
